

DCI Testimony before

Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on
Strategic and Theater Nuclear Forces

19 Mar 82

Return to:
SA/DCI/IA

MEMORANDUM FOR: DDCI

Attached is the text used by the DCI this morning at the Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on Strategic and Theater Nuclear Forces. I understand it is the same text provided to you for your earlier testimonies.

25X1 [] accompanied him and reported that the hearing went smoothly. Senator Chafee asked for a couple of items, which [] is handling.*

25X1 [] mentioned that the HAC Defense Subcommittee hearing on the NFIP scheduled for next Thursday has been postponed--not yet rescheduled.



Date 19 March 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: DDCI

* The two items requested by Senator Chafee:

- a copy of the Unclassified version of the Chemical Warfare SNIE (this has gone to him with the understanding that it is embargoed until officially released to the public on Monday)
- information on the status of the proposed new CIA building at Langley



Approved For Release 2006/05/25 : CIA-RDP84B0

Date 19 March 1982

NFIP OVERVIEW TESTIMONYFY 1983 BUDGET

MR. CHAIRMAN AND MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE:

THROUGHOUT THE DECADE OF THE 1980'S, U.S. FOREIGN POLICY DECISIONMAKERS WILL FACE GREAT CHALLENGES AND UNCERTAINTIES FROM MANY QUARTERS. THEIR SUCCESS IN MEETING THOSE CHALLENGES WILL RELY HEAVILY ON THE PROVISION OF TIMELY, ACCURATE, AND INSIGHTFUL INTELLIGENCE. AT THE SAME TIME, DEMANDS ON INTELLIGENCE HAVE GROWN, AND WILL CONTINUE TO DO SO. IN RECENT YEARS, WE HAVE WATCHED THE WORLD BECOME INCREASINGLY DIVERSE; WE HAVE WITNESSED THE EMERGENCE OF A SOVIET UNION INCREASINGLY WILLING TO INTERVENE WITH MILITARY FORCE; WE HAVE EXPERIENCED A TECHNOLOGICAL REVOLUTION ACCOMPANIED BY AN EXPLOSION IN THE QUANTITY AND TYPE OF DATA AVAILABLE TO THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY; AND WE HAVE SEEN THE ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE EXPAND BEYOND DIPLOMATIC AND MILITARY ISSUES. THESE DEVELOPMENTS, TOGETHER WITH A DECADE OF DECLINING REAL BUDGETS AND MANPOWER, GIVE RISE TO AN OVERWHELMING NEED FOR REVITALIZING AND STRENGTHENING OUR NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES.

25X1

THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM FOR FY 1983, WHICH YOU HAVE BEFORE YOU, REPRESENTS AN IMPORTANT STEP IN THIS PROCESS. I BELIEVE THAT THE COMMITMENT TO SUBSTANTIAL REAL GROWTH REFLECTED IN THE NFIP BUDGET SUBMISSION

25X1

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject
to Criminal Sanctions.

IS ESSENTIAL TO MEET THE CHALLENGES AHEAD. THE BUDGET FOR FY 1983 CALLS FOR

THIS AMOUNT OFFSETS
THE ANTICIPATED EFFECT OF INFLATION AND PROVIDES FOR NECESSARY REAL GROWTH IN
ALL COMPONENT PROGRAMS.

DCI GOALS

IN PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING FOR THE 1980'S, A SET OF DCI GOALS HAS BEEN
FORMULATED FOR THE FY 1983-FY 1987 PROGRAM PERIOD, AND BEYOND. THESE GOALS,
OUTLINED HERE IN BRIEF, WILL REQUIRE OUR CONCENTRATED EFFORT AND AN INFUSION OF
RESOURCES TO ACHIEVE INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES NECESSARY FOR THE LONG TERM. IN
SOME CASES THE RESOURCES REQUESTED FOR FY 1983 REPRESENT A CONTINUATION OF
EFFORTS BEGUN IN FY 1982; MANY OF THE NEW INITIATIVES ARE ONLY A FIRST STEP IN
A LONG-TERM COMMITMENT. THESE GOALS ARE:

(1) TO INCREASE ACCESS TO THE POLITICAL, MILITARY, AND ECONOMIC POLICIES
AND INTENTIONS OF THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP. THIS WILL BE PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT
DURING THE NEXT DECADE, GIVEN THE LIKELIHOOD OF A TRANSITION IN SOVIET
LEADERSHIP. SOVIET USES OF AND RELATIONS WITH PROXIES ARE ALSO OF GREAT
INTEREST.

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

(10) TO ENHANCE OUR ABILITY TO PROVIDE INTELLIGENCE ON TERRORISM, ESPIONAGE, AND INTERNATIONAL ILLEGALITIES. THESE ARE REAL AND GROWING THREATS TO THE STABILITY OF THE WORLD ORDER AND U.S. SECURITY. ABOVE ALL ELSE, WE REQUIRE MANPOWER FOR ANALYSIS AND OPERATIONS. EFFECTIVE SECURITY, COUNTER-MEASURES, AND SUPPORT OF U.S. COUNTEROPERATIONS WHEN NECESSARY, DEPEND ON INTELLIGENCE ABOUT ORGANIZATIONS, PLANS, FINANCES, PERSONNEL, AND TECHNIQUES INTENDED FOR USE BY BOTH FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS AND VIOLENT ORGANIZATIONS. [REDACTED]

25X1

(11) TO PROVIDE SURGE CAPABILITY TO DEAL WITH CRISES. RECENT PROLONGED CRISES, SUCH AS THOSE IN AFGHANISTAN AND POLAND, HAVE CONSUMED SCARCE RESOURCES TO PROVIDE COMPREHENSIVE, TIMELY INTELLIGENCE ON GEOGRAPHIC AREAS NOT ROUTINELY COVERED IN DEPTH. THERE IS A CRITICAL NEED TO DEVELOP MORE FLEXIBLE COLLECTION ACCESS, TO DEVISE BETTER MANAGEMENT OF CRISIS OPERATIONS AND ANALYSIS, AND TO INCREASE ASSOCIATED MANPOWER. [REDACTED]

25X1

(12) TO ENSURE THE MANPOWER AND ANALYTIC INFRASTRUCTURE EXISTS TO SUPPORT PROCESSING AND ANALYSIS REQUIREMENTS BEYOND THE NEAR TERM. WE MUST SUSTAIN THE BROAD-BASED EFFORT TO MODERNIZE THE PROCESSING SYSTEMS THAT SUPPORT COLLECTION. WE MUST PROVIDE ANALYSTS THE SYSTEMS NECESSARY TO INCREASE THEIR PRODUCTIVITY. INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS, HOWEVER, WILL REMAIN MANPOWER-INTENSIVE, AND WE MUST INCREASE OUR ACCESS TO THE AVAILABLE SKILLED PERSONNEL. [REDACTED]

25X1

(13) TO IMPROVE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNICATIONS. WE MUST FACILITATE THE PROPER FLOW OF VAST QUANTITIES OF DATA FROM THE COLLECTION SYSTEMS AND AT THE SAME TIME ENSURE TIMELY, TAILORED INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO THE USERS OF

25X1

TOP SECRET

25X1

INTELLIGENCE, INCLUDING U.S. MILITARY COMMANDERS WORLDWIDE. PROGRAMS ARE CURRENTLY UNDER WAY TO UPGRADE EXISTING COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS, BUT ADDED EMPHASIS MUST BE PLACED ON A SUFFICIENTLY FLEXIBLE AND ROBUST SYSTEM.

25X1

FY 1983 NFIP BUDGET OVERVIEW

THE NEW NFIP CAPABILITIES PROGRAMMING AND BUDGETING (CPB) SYSTEM NOW IN PLACE ORGANIZES THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BUDGET INTO FIVE MAJOR CATEGORIES: POSITIVE INTELLIGENCE (INCLUDING PRODUCTION, COLLECTION, AND PROCESSING), COUNTERINTELLIGENCE, COVERT ACTION, GENERAL SUPPORT, AND OTHER ACTIVITIES

25X1

Chart C

FIGURE 1 ILLUSTRATES

HOW NFIP RESOURCES FOR FY 1983 ARE ALLOCATED AMONG THESE CATEGORIES. POSITIVE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES ARE DIRECTED AGAINST TARGETS--DEFINED IN TERMS OF GEOGRAPHIC REGIONS AND INTELLIGENCE SUBJECTS. IN PREPARING THE FY 1983 BUDGET SUBMISSION, WE HAVE ASSESSED CURRENT CAPABILITIES AGAINST AGGREGATE TARGETS, IDENTIFIED SHORTFALLS, AND OUTLINED PROPOSED INITIATIVES IN THE FY 1983-FY 1987 PROGRAM AGAINST THESE TARGETS. I WOULD LIKE TO SUMMARIZE FOR YOU THE OUTCOME OF THAT EXERCISE, AND TO ADDRESS FY 1983 NFIP INITIATIVES IN THIS TARGET/TOPIC CONTEXT. *Chart D* FIGURE 2 SHOWS A BREAKOUT OF FY 1983 RESOURCES DEVOTED TO POSITIVE

INTELLIGENCE, BY TARGET. *(The regions are defined on the next chart.)*

THE SOVIET UNION IS THE MOST IMPORTANT, COMPLEX, AND OPERATIONALLY DIFFICULT INTELLIGENCE TARGET CONFRONTING US. *(See the next chart)*

25X1

25X1

TOP SECRET

25X1

Next 14 Page(s) In Document Exempt